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Utilising Microsimulation to Estimate New Marginal 
Returns to Education: Ireland 1987-2005 
 
In this paper we utilise microsimulation techniques in the form of an income generation model 
and a tax/benefit model to estimate both the fiscal and net private return to education at a 
marginal level. This is carried out empirically using Irish data across the period 1987-2005 
and is the first study to utilise these techniques in such a manner. The results indicate that a 
more generous tax/benefit system, combined with a greater state burden of the cost of 
education over this period may have helped increase the individual’s return to education, 
while reducing the state return from investing in education. The methodology employed 
allows us to specifically analyse the impact of various components of the tax/benefit system 
upon these returns across time and show the role of income tax changes upon the return to 
education for the individual and the state. 
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1  INTRODUCTION   
The relationship between an individual’s education and earnings has formed the basis 
for much empirical work in the economics of education produced in the past fifty 
years (See Card, 1999 and Harmon et al, 2001). This has focused on comparing the 
private benefits of extra education in the shape of higher lifecycle earnings against the 
private cost to the individual of education.  
However, several possible issues with the basic specification of this methods have 
been highlighted; higher gross earnings from education may vary taxes/benefit 
liabilities (Heckman et al, 2008) and extra education may affect labour supply 
decisions (Booth and Coles, 2007; Trostel and Walker, 2006), which may alter the 
estimated return to education from a private viewpoint. Allied to this, estimates of the 
fiscal returns to education are largely ignored within the literature to date. The fiscal 
return to education can determine the return to government from expenditure on 
education as the amount of tax paid and social benefits received are related to gross 
earnings. Fiscal returns in addition to private returns may help frame policy decision 
making in relation to the financing of education.  
There have been a few studies that have attempted to explicitly model net income 
(gross income + benefits – taxes) into the measure of returns to education. 
Noonemans and Cortens (1997) use micro tax for Belgium to estimate fiscal and net 
private returns using an internal rate of return (IRR) method. However, they only 
incorporate income tax and social contributions, ignoring benefits and other taxes. 
They also ignore the possible employment effect of education. O’Donoghue (1999) 
used the European tax/benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD to estimate the 
marginal fiscal and net private returns to education for four European countries 
including Ireland, using 1994 tax/benefit rules. While this study did incorporate the 
possible employment effect of education in its estimations, it did so at the national 
average level and not at the micro level. Also, it did not account for education related 
pension income changes. De la Fuente and Jimeno (2009) estimate the private and 
fiscal returns to education across 14 European countries. This study does incorporate 
some benefits as its uses unemployment and pension benefits, however, it uses 
average national wage data to estimate the education impact of gross earnings in place 
of micro data and assumes each individual is single with no children when applying 
income tax rates on individuals. The OCED (2008b) has also provided the fiscal and 
private rates of return for a range of countries. They incorporate an employment effect 
and income tax effect of extra education similar to that seen in earlier estimates. 
However, they again use national average tax rates with the assumption that 
individuals are single with no children and the study does not take into account 
possible employment effects. Also, these estimates also do not include the educational 
impact on varying social welfare levels.  
In this paper we utilise a microsimulation model to try to capture the fiscal and 
employment effect associated with education, incorporating the heterogeneity of the 
population to estimate both the fiscal and net private return to education at a marginal level for the period 1987-2005 using Irish data. Incorporating the tax/benefit system 
and labour market participation effects at a micro level may help us arrive at a more 
accurate estimation of these returns with these techniques never utilised before with 
respect to educational outcomes.  
The next section identifies some possible adjustments and deficiencies within the 
traditional estimation of the marginal returns to education. A specification of the 
calculation of each of our returns, attempting to compensate for any possible 
adjustments or deficiencies is then presented. In the following section we explore the 
methodologies utilised, including an income generation model. We then present our 
results for the estimates of the marginal net private and fiscal returns to education. 
Finally, we conclude the paper. 
2  MINCERIAN RETURNS TO EDUCATION: BACKGROUND AND POSSIBLE 
ADJUSTMENTS  
The basic Mincerian earnings approach to estimating the return to education is 
specified by equation 1 below and pioneered by the work of Becker and Chiswick 
(1966) and Mincer (1974).  
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Where Y is an earnings measure (typically gross earnings) for individual i, S is years 
of schooling and T is the potential labour market experience after education, X is a 
vector of the individuals personal characteristics and ν  is unobserved characteristics. 
Using OLS techniques from the above specification, the coefficient   1 β  can be 
interpreted as the average rate of return to schooling (See Card 1999; Trotstal et al 
2002; Harmon at al 2001 and Harmon et al 2002)  
2.1  Possible Adjustments and Deficiencies  
Despite their popular use, a number of potential adjustments and/or deficiencies with 
the earnings functions methodologies involved in measuring the returns to education 
may be raised.  
Firstly, if gross earnings is utilised for  i Y , the non-linear impact of the tax/benefit 
system and consequential bias in the estimate of private returns is ignored Heckman et 
al, 200x) with the progressive nature of most tax-benefit systems likely to reduce the 
private return to education. Some studies, have incorporated the role of the tax system 
throught the use of net earnings (See Harmon et al 2001; Trostel et al 2002; and 
Harmon et al 2002). However, this framework does not allow the measurement of 
fiscal returns. 
Similarly, theses studies typically ignore the role of employment effects in measuring 
the net return to education. The specification of the returns to education in equation 1 
assumes that that changes in earnings capture the full benefit of investing in 
education. This ignores the possible employment effect of education. Nickel (1979) and Mincer (1991) both show that for Great Britain and the USA respectively, higher 
levels of education reduces the probability of being unemployed. Therefore, the 
transition from unemployment to employment resulting from extra education will 
increase the return to that education. Conversely, the return may close to zero if an 
individual does not enter or leave the labour market post education.  
In placing the focus on earnings as the sole benefit of education, any pension related 
or financial asset which may be a function of life-cycle earnings are also ignored. As 
higher education levels are associated with higher earnings it may be plausible to 
suggest that a higher education may increase an individual’s pension income or the 
probability of having an occupational pension. With respect to financial assets, 
Soloman (1975) finds that those with higher levels of education may gain some 
private benefits from having better portfolio management, with a greater probability 
of holding and seeing higher returns from riskier investments.  
The relationship between income, education, employment probabilities and the tax 
benefit system can be illustrated with a simple equation as illustrated below.  
 
) TB(Y     Y g n =                                                                                                                                   (2) 
Where 
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Yn is net income, Yg is gross income and TB represents the tax/benefit rules which are 
dictated to by gross income. However, gross income is dependent on gross earnings 
(Ye), whether or not an individual is in work (p_Ye), other non-work income inflows 
and outflows (Ym) and the probability of having such inflows or outflows of income 
(p_Ym), all of which are dependent on schooling level S.  
While  1 β  from equation 1 above is generally presented as the average private return 
to education within many estimates that use the Mincerian earnings function 
specification, accounting for factors such as the employment and tax/benefit effects of 
education may help investigate the net benefits to the individual of extra education.  
From equations 2 and 3  above, the employment effect of education effect partially 
drives the earnings effect and potential other non-labour income may drive with 
overall income levels which in turn drives the overall gross income education 
differential. However, the redistributive nature of the tax-benefit system can alter this 
differential by reducing benefits and higher tax rates as gross incomes rise.  
We can use these equations to measure the fiscal return to education. The possible 
interaction of education and tax/benefit liabilities entail that analysing the changes in 
taxes and benefits from a change in education relative to the public cost of this extra 
education can provide an estimate of the return the government receives from 
investing in education.  Perhaps the most considered critique in measurements of the returns to education stem 
from potential bias in the OLS estimates using the Mincerian earnings function 
specification due to endogenity. This bias may come from the error term in equation 
26 being correlated with education due to omitting ability as a control in estimations. 
Instrumental variable (IV) estimates such as those conducted by Harmon and Walker 
(1995) for the UK show that OLS estimates may be negatively biased as a result. 
However, Card (2001b) and Harmon et al (2002) acknowledge that some caution 
must be shown in relying on IV estimates, mainly due to choice of instrument. Also, 
Callan and Harmon (1999) suggest that OLS estimates are not significantly biased 
downwards when compared to IV estimates in a study using Irish data and this 
potential bias is not within the focus of the research presented in this paper.   
2.2  Alternative Measures of the Returns to Education 
We use a methodology similar to O’Donoghue (1999) to measure the marginal returns 
to education. This is defined as the ratio of the benefit of a marginal difference in 
education to the cost of the marginal change in education
1 from both a private and 
fiscal viewpoint. We first specify the marginal private rate of return as 
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The numerator here specifies the net benefits to the individual from a marginal change 
in education. The tax/benefit element is broken down into various elements and the 
change in earnings from a one year increase in education is highlighted.  
Specifically, Ys+1– Ys is the change in gross earnings from moving from level s 
education to level s+1 (Ys is the actual wage without an increase in education level, 
Ys+1 is the gross salary after one more year of schooling). If we assume that gross 
wage increases with education, then this benefit should be a positive value. However, 
this may be conditional on the fact an individual is in work and is captured by the 
term p_empw above.  If an individual is not in work, either before or after the change 
in level of education, then this benefit may be zero. We note 
s Y − +1 ms Y
as the change 
in miscellaneous other incomes and payments that may vary due to changes in 
education such as income from capital investments, income from an occupational 
pension and outflows such as pension contributions that may impact the taxable 
income of an individual. As with earnings, having such income or contributions may 
also be dependent on education level, a fact captured by the term p_Ym and also may 
be reduced by any tax on this income tm. The term ssee is the employee rate of social 
insurance contributions while t is the income tax rate, all of these will be conditional 
gross earnings and the probability of being in work, but may also be dependent on 
other inflows and outflows such as capital income and pension contributions. The 
term  1 s bY + are the benefits received at level s+1 of schooling, while  s bY  represents 
                                                 
1 As with O’Donoghue (1999) it is acknowledged that these costs and benefits may not take place at the 
same time and so an assumption of the discount rate equating to the growth rate may be used for 
convenience.   the benefits that one might receive with level s of education. These benefits are 
generally contingent on gross income and include unemployment benefit, pension 
benefit and child benefit. Again the benefits with schooling level s+1 may be 
expected to be lower than  s bY  in a progressive tax/benefit system, thus lowering the 
return to the individual. 
The denominator of equation 4 represents the costs to the individual of changing from 
one level of education to another where Yn = Y’1 - Y’0 is the net wage foregone 
during schooling (Y’1 is the foregone wage while in education and Y’0 is the wages 
while a student) and  s p_emp is the probability of being employed while in schooling. 
The term ssee is the employee social insurance contribution, t is the income tax rate, 
all of which will be dependent on Yn.  n bY  is seen as the benefits foregone while in 
education and may include benefits such as unemployment assistance. Ep is the direct 
private costs involved in moving from one year of education to another and captures 
only the individual’s contribution to this change. The net private IRR is the value 
rprivate takes when the ratio of the marginal benefits and marginal costs is calculated.  
Next we specify a measure of the marginal return to education from a fiscal viewpoint  
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It is now the marginal benefits to the state that are the numerator of our equation, with 
the notation of the terms seen in equation 5 remaining the same. One new term is seen 
on the benefits side, sser , representing employer social insurance contributions. As we 
are now concerned with the state’s return, higher employment probabilities, higher 
earnings and other incomes from a change in education levels may entail higher taxes, 
social insurance contributions and lower benefits and represent a benefit to the state.  
The denominator marginal cost element of the fiscal return to education is much the 
same as that seen with equation 4 with similar terms involved. However, the term 
g E replaces the direct private cost of education and represents the public cost of 
varying education levels. The fiscal IRR is the value rfiscal  when the ratio of the 
marginal benefits and marginal costs of education to the state is calculated. 
3  DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The data used in this paper comes from the Living in Ireland survey. This survey is a 
household panel dataset which ran from 1994 to 2001. It contains a variety of income, 
social, demographic and labour market variables at the individual and household 
levels. The sampling frame for the survey comes from the electoral register in Ireland 
with the original sample size of 4,048 interviewed households, with over 14,000 
individuals in these households. Like any other panel dataset attrition was a problem 
and by the final wave the number of interviewed households fell to 2,865, with just 
over 9,000 individuals in the final wave. The data is weighted to reflect independent population estimates and to correct for possible attrition
2. It also includes information 
on individual’s highest level of education completed in the following categories.  
•  Higher degree 
•  Primary degree 
•  Diploma or equivalent   
•  Post Leaving Certificate courses 
•  Leaving certificate (State exam at the end of 2nd level education) 
•  Junior or Intermediate certificate (State exam after 3 years of 2
nd level 
education) 
•  Some 2
nd level, no exams 
•  Primary certificate 
•  No education beyond primary  
For the purpose of estimating the marginal returns to education, the above education 
attainment variables have been transformed to the number of years of education and 
are described in table 1a
3. The distribution of the education level in the seventh wave 
of the data (the wave to be specifically used in our analysis) is described in table 1b.  
To estimate the marginal rates of return to education from a net private and fiscal 
viewpoint at a micro level, a detailed breakdown of the possible tax/benefit 
implications of varying incomes levels is needed. This is achieved using a tax/benefit 
static microsimulation model that applies all tax and benefit rules on an individual or 
household based upon their gross income (or the gross income of the household) for 
Ireland for the years 1987-2005. The tax/benefit rules in Ireland from 1987-2005 are 
simulated upon the 2000 population of our data with the income levels of individuals 
and households are scaled up or down by a GDP deflator depending on the year of 
tax/benefit rules being applied to the data
4. Static microsimulation models such as this 
have been developed to analyse complex interactions at the micro level, especially the 
impact of tax and social benefit systems on individuals and households with model 
developed for the UK (POLIMOD), the USA (TRIM), Canada (SPSD) and Australia 
(STINMOD)
5 and for Ireland with the SWITCH model of the ESRI (Callan, et al 
1996).  
                                                 
2 For more details on this data please see Flannery and O’Donoghue (2009).  
3 As a note of caution, these transformations are purely approximate as they do not allow for variation 
in the number of years to complete, however, we have opted on the conservative side if the number of 
years for each level can vary. 
4 A key aspect involved in using a tax/benefit microsimulation model is to provide validation of the 
simulated results, the results or our model are broadly in line with the similar validation measures 
undertaken for the Irish component of EUROMOD (Callan et al, 2005) and can be provided upon 
request to the author.  
5 See Merz (1991) and Gupta and Kapur (2000) for a description of these particular models.  As this paper uses the tax/benefit systems from 1987 to 2005 for Ireland, table 2 
illustrates the main changes in the system between these years to provide some 
indication of how our measures of the returns to education may vary across the 
tax/benefit years. In general across our reference period table 3 shows that Ireland 
experienced falling income tax rates combined with more generous social benefits. 
With respect to the returns to education to be estimated, this may suggest a falling of 
tax on human capital accumulation, benefiting the individual and costing the state.  
3.1  Estimating Direct Costs and Indirect Costs of Education 
To gauge the private and public costs of education we use per student expenditure by 
education level the OECD for the years 1997-2008, adjusted from US$ to Euro and 
purchasing power parity. To separate the burden of this cost across private/public 
delineation we multiply by the public/private share (OECD, 1997-2008). A summary 
of these costs for each year is seen in table 4
6.  
The private and public expenditures are both increasing in absolute levels in nearly 
every year across all education levels
7, however, public expenditure increases at a 
higher rate than private expenditure. Public expenditure on tertiary education more 
than doubles over the period 1987-2005, while private expenditure shows only a small 
increase. The same can be seen to a lesser extent from both primary and secondary 
education. This may result in decreasing fiscal returns to investing in education 
throughout our reference period as the public cost increase substantially across all 
education levels.  
The indirect costs of education vary depending on which type of return is being 
estimated. However, they all are related to the foregone earnings cost expressed by 
the term  n Y in equations 4 and 5. This term is derived in this study using age-earnings 
and employment profiles of cohorts for different education levels. Utilising this we 
are then able to calculate the foregone costs in terms of the fiscal, private and social.  
To calculate  n Y for different education levels we first assume that foregone earnings 
are zero for an individual that currently has primary level education. This suggests 
that if this individual had a marginal increase in education, the earnings they would 
forego would be zero. For the rest of the population we specify four labour states an 
individual may be in:  
1.  In employment and not attending education 
2.  Unemployed,  
3.  Part-time employment and attending education,  
4.  Attending education full time with no employment.  
                                                 
6 As no expenditure figure and the public/private breakdown of this expenditure could be obtained from 
the OECD for 1987 and 1996 for Ireland, the 1987 figure is the 1994 figure multiplied by a GDP 
deflator in order to calculate this figure while the 1996 figures are calculated in a similar fashion using 
the 1997 figures available.  
7 Expenditure levels are also seen to increase in constant terms across the period but are not presented, 
see OECD (2010) for more details. As the level of the opportunity cost an individual faces may vary by which level of 
education they are undertaking, we next identify the individuals in the sample that 
have indicated lower secondary as their highest level of education complete and are 
aged between 16 and 17. We also identify the individuals in the sample that have 
upper secondary as their highest level of education complete and are aged between 17 
and 18. Finally we obtain a sample of individuals that have tertiary education as their 
highest level complete and are aged between 21 and 22. We segment each of these 
respective samples into the four education/labour states these individuals indicate they 
are in. To obtain the term  n Y  from equations 4 and 5 (which can also be seen as Y’1 - 
Y’0)  we use cross sectional weighted averages of earnings of the population of those 
in work and not in education from each of the three education/age cohorts we have 
specified. This gives us the term Y’1 (earnings foregone while in education) for three 
separate education levels. We also get the weighted average earnings of the 
individuals in the sample that go to full time education and work part time to arrive at 
the term Y’0.  This is then performed across the three cohorts we have with the 
varying age and education levels. This gives us a foregone earnings term for both 
lower and upper secondary education and tertiary education. A similar methodology is 
used to obtain terms for the foregone taxes, benefits and social contributions needed 
for an accurate estimate of the foregone costs from a fiscal and private stance. With 
regards to taxes and social contributions we can view this as T1 - T0, sser1 – sser0, ssee1 
– ssee0 where the subscript 1 relates to the average income tax, employer social 
contribution and employee social contribution for an individual in work and not in 
education, again this is performed across our three cohorts separately. The terms 
denoted with the subscript 0 signify the average income tax, employer social 
contribution and employee social contribution in our sample for those in education 
and working part time. The foregone benefit term  ] b[Yn  from equations 4 and 5 is 
derived in much the same way as above with the average benefit received from those 
in work reduced by the average benefit received by individuals while in education and 
in work. This gives us the terms needed to calculate each of the costs needed to 
calculate the measures of return to education from a fiscal and net private aspect.   
3.2  Simulating a Marginal Change in Education Using an IGM Model 
Given the tax/benefit microsimulation model and costs outlined above, the next 
methodological consideration for estimating the private and fiscal returns is the 
impact of a marginal increase in education upon gross income. As equation Xx above 
illustrates the gross income of an individual is the sum of a range of different factors 
including gross earnings. Given the role education may have in shaping a variety of 
different facets of gross income an income generation model (IGM) is also utilised to 
capture the variations in this income that may come about from a marginal change in 
education.  
The IGM model forms its origins from the work of Oaxaca (1973) and is described in 
detail in Bourguignon, Ferreria and Lustig (2005) and Bourguignon et al (2003) and 
has been used to assess the redistributive impact of economic change in developing 
countries. More specifically, they use a series of reduced form models which include; 
labor force participation models, employee earnings models, self-employed earnings 
models and capital earnings models to help calculate the distribution of total household income for East Asian and Latin American countries. The methodology 
employed involves modelling the incomes and choice outcomes of individuals using 
various econometric regressions with residuals being interpreted as individual fixed 
effects. Simulations can then be performed based on the deterministic estimations of 
these choice outcomes and incomes.   
We wish to model the impact of years of education on various outcomes that may 
have an eventual influence on the gross income level and hence the tax/benefit 
situation of a household/individual. For the sake of simplicity we limit ourselves to 
two econometric specifications for our IGM estimations. Logit models were used 
when faced with a binary choice situation while OLS regressions were employed in 
the case of continuous dependent variables.  
With the former estimation procedure we use the binary decision of labour force 
participation as an example of the methodology used. In our model this is a discrete 
choice, with an individual either participating in the labour force or not, whereby you 
are in the labour force if you have some form of working income and are over the 
working age (>=16). We represent this with equation 6 below  
0 X IW i i i > + + = ε β α                                 (6) 
Where  i IW  is a binary variable equal to unity if individual i if earning some form of 
income or zero otherwise. Individuals chose between the two according to some 
criteria the value of which is specific to the alternative. The option with the highest 
criterion value is selected. The criterion value associated with non participation in the 
labour market is set to zero, whereas the value of being in work is a function of 
interceptα , individual characteristics  i X β  and unobserved effects i ε . An individual 
will prefer work if the value of the criterion associated with that activity is higher than 
that associated with inactivity which we have set as zero. This is the situation 
represented in equation 6 above. The opposite can also be true, if the criterion 
associated with being in work is less than zero, then the individual will prefer 
inactivity. The termsα  and  i X β   can be estimated simply using the logit model 
estimations. For the unobserved fixed effects  i ε  are drawn randomly from the 
relevant distribution
8. This methodology is employed for a range of binary choice 
model outcomes that may alter the tax/benefit situation of an individual or household, 
the full list of these can be seen in table 5.   
To illustrate the methodology used in the context of continuous income variables we 
take the example of employee earnings. This can be represented by equation 1 seen 
previously where the logarithm of employee earnings of individual i  i LnY  is a 
function of his/her years of education i S , labour market experience T, personal 
characteristics  i X  and unobserved characteristics i ν . This is viewed as estimating the 
relationship between gross employee earnings and years of education. The relevant 
coefficients and residual terms can be estimated using ordinary least squares 
regression on a sample of individuals that are seen to draw their income from being in 
                                                 
8 See Bourguignon et al (2003) for more details on this process employment. For non-working individuals in the base data,  i ν   is missing. We sample 
from the relevant distribution to get an estimate of  i ν  for this group  
In our estimations an attempt was made to keep the explanatory variables for the 
various estimations consistent with one another where appropriate with years of 
education, regional dummies, age and its square and martial status some of the 
regressors included. Separate estimations for all the models were run for males and 
females and all estimations are presented in appendix A of the paper. We briefly note 
that employee earnings, self employee earnings the probability of being in work are 
positively related to the years of education obtained and the other estimations do 
behave as expected with regard to education.   
3.3  Simulation using the IGM and Tax/benefit models 
From the deterministic part of each model we simulate the impact of an extra year of 
education on each of the outcomes from table 5. To simulate an extra year of 
education we simply hold all estimates constant with the exception of the years of 
education explanatory variable which is allowed to increase by one year for all 
individuals. This simulated change may shift individuals from previous states, such as 
being out of work, to being in work by adjusting the criteria value we saw above in 
equation 6
8. If this occurs and the individual now satisfies the stipulated criteria, their 
status is changed. This then feeds into estimates of income levels such as employee 
income, if the individual is found to have moved into work, they are now assigned 
some level of work income (employee, self-employed or farm income) based upon 
our previous OLS estimations with unobserved characteristics  i ν  treated as fixed 
effects.  
 
When the simulation is complete we now have two datasets. We have the base 2000 
data and the 2000 data with a simulated increase in education, the latter incorporating 
the various changes this increase may bring about such as higher gross earnings and 
more individuals in work. These can be used as inputs into the static tax/benefit 
microsimulation module outlined above to arrive at our two measures of the marginal 
returns to education. Tax/benefit microsimultion models, by simulating tax liabilities 
and benefit entitlements, can estimate the net impact of government policies on an 
individual. A Tax/benefit microsimulation model can thus be described in 
mathematical terms as follows: 
Y
n = f(Yi,j, Gk,j, Xj⏐∀ i∈ I, ⏐∀ k∈ K, ∀ j ∈  H)      (7) 
where Yi,j is the set of exogenous incomes i, such as wages, self employment income, 
investment income and other incomes for individuals j in household H. Gk,j is the set 
of government incomes, k simulated in the model, such as pension and unemployment 
benefits. Xj is the vector of other characteristics such as marital status, employment 
status, number of children, number of years of education etc. Using the output of the 
IGM model combined the simulated taxes and benefits we obtain a ‘before and after’ 
picture of all of these exogenous incomes and government incomes with respect to a 
marginal change in education, thus providing us with the platform to estimate the 
fiscal and net private return to education as outlined in equations 4 and 5.  4  EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
The results of the average marginal fiscal and net private return to education for 
Ireland using the 1987-2005 tax/benefit rules are presented in table 6. We analyse our 
results in a number of different ways, first comparing the results across the varying 
tax/benefit rules.  
 
4.1  Marginal Rates of Return across Varying Tax/Benefit Rules  
Looking at the various measures of returns as we vary the tax/benefit rules and the 
cost of education in Ireland we see there is a decline in the fiscal return to education 
as we move from the 1987 rules and education cost structure up to the 2005 scenario. 
From table 6 we see the fiscal return at its highest under the 1987 tax/benefit rules at 
8.9%, however, this falls in every year of our analysis to stand at 6.9% by 2005. The 
net private return to education trends in the opposite direction, increasing from 9.0% 
with the 1987 tax/benefit rules, to a high of 11.1% with the 2005 system. As the 
movement across the period 1987-2005 here is the result of variations in the 
tax/benefit rules and higher education cost structures, it can be suggested that across 
this time period the tax and cost burden placed on extra education has been reduced to 
such an extent that it has helped increase the return to the individual from education 
while at the same time reducing the state’s return.  
The results from the private return to education would seem to be in line with Callan 
and Harmon (1999) who use the gross earnings of workers in Ireland to estimate the 
private returns to education in Ireland using an earnings function approach with data 
from 1987 and find a marginal private rate of return to year of schooling of between 
7%-10%
9. Therefore it may be suggested that incorporating the tax/benefit and 
employment effects of a marginal increase in education may nullify each other and 
bring out estimates close to the simple gross earnings estimates. O’Donoghue (1999) 
showed a fiscal and net private return to education for Ireland of 5.3% and 14.4% 
respectively using 1994 tax/benefit rules with 1987 data, indicating our estimates 
using the 2000 dataset slightly higher with respect to the fiscal return and lower with 
respect to the net private return. However given the differences in methodological 
approaches between the two papers it is difficult to draw any firm reasoning for such 
a divergence.  
McGuinness et al (2008) show decreasing marginal private returns across the 1990’s 
for Ireland using gross earnings data while our results show an increasing trend. This 
may be explained by the fact the McGuinness study uses different sample populations 
in its estimates and so the varying returns to education within this study are driven by 
labour market/macro economic affects. The increasing returns to education presented 
within our study are solely as a result of policy changes with regard to tax/benefit 
rules and education cost structures with the sample population constant. The 
contradicting results may indicate that incorporating the tax/benefit system within 
estimates of the returns to education over time for Ireland may offset some of the 
possible reductions in the private return to education due to the shifting 
                                                 
9 This paper uses both OLS and IV methods in their calculations education/earnings distribution that may have occurred across the period
10. It is clear 
that the variations in the tax/benefit system over our reference period have combined 
to reduce the state return to education, perhaps suggesting a move towards placing the 
financial burden of education on the individual may be warranted. While the issue of 
education financing is particularly focused towards third level education in Ireland, a 
more generous tax/benefit system, combined with a falling fiscal return to education 
seen in table 6 suggests that more of the financial burden of education should be 
placed upon the individual and away from the state. It must be noted that the results 
here are only estimated for a general marginal change in education (not just higher 
education) but may still be informative to the policies surrounding higher education 
finance.  
4.2  Marginal Rates of Return Broken Down by Various Components 
Due to the simulation process involved in constructing the marginal benefits of the 
various returns to education it is relatively simple to breakdown these estimates by the 
various benefits that drive them. This is seen in tables 7 to 8, with various estimates of 
the marginal private and fiscal returns presented by segmenting the components of the 
numerator (benefits) for each return. The cost element is held constant across these 
estimates for each respective tax/benefit year, and is the same denominator for each 
respective return seen in equations 4 and 5. This may help establish the particular 
elements of the tax/benefit changes from 1987-2005 that drove the varying private 
and fiscal returns to education. Also, as the cost element varies from 1987-2005, this 
procedure may also allow us to comment on the impact of varying costs on the returns 
estimated.  
The return to the individual is initially presented under the scenario of no tax/benefit 
system in place, no employment effect and no pension or capital income effect of a 
change in education. Therefore column A of table 7 represents the marginal private 
return with the benefits only stemming from the change in earnings a marginal change 
in education may bring about. As the marginal benefit within the sample for this 
measure will remain constant, the varying return to the individual across 1987-2005 
seen in table 7 can be explained by the variations in the marginal cost to the 
individual. The marginal costs consists of the direct and indirect costs, however, given 
the methodology in constructing the indirect costs of education from a private 
viewpoint, these will remain relatively constant across the varying tax/benefit years. 
This, allied to the magnitude of the changes in column A from table 7 as we move 
from 1987-2005 suggest that the variations in direct private costs of education across 
these years have a relatively small positive impact on the private return.  
As we move across columns in table 7 more components of the marginal benefit to 
education are added while the marginal cost remains constant. This illustrates that the 
return to the individual rises as the pension and capital income effects of changes in 
education are accounted for, while this return falls as variations in taxes, benefits and 
employee SIC are included.  We can see from the magnitudes of these changes that 
                                                 
10 Although not presented within this paper for parsimony, the authors have estimated the fiscal and net 
private return to education across the 1987-2005 tax/benefit rules using the 1994 wave of the Living in 
Ireland dataset with the results supporting this viewpoint of a decreasing marginal private return to 
education due to labour market variations but an increasing marginal private return due to tax/benefit 
and education polices.  the initial earnings effect, the role of taxes and the employment effect have the 
greatest influence in determining the final estimate we have for the private return to 
education. Private pension income is also seen to have a substantial impact on the 
return to the individual, while SIC’s and capital income effects are relatively small. 
As we vary the tax/benefit year analysed we see that the negative impact of taxes on 
this return falls substantially as we move towards the tax/benefit rules of 2005, 
suggesting changes in the tax system in Ireland have played a significant role in 
increasing the marginal net private return to education. While the impact of 
incorporating changes in social benefits and SIC’s on this return falls over the period 
1987-2005, they are not as substantial as those seen for income tax.   
It is also noticeable from the estimates in table 7 that the inclusion of the tax/benefit 
system drives the private return to education below the estimate when using only the 
earnings effect, as seen by comparing the estimates given in column A and column F. 
It is the employment effect of a marginal increase in education that drives this return 
over and above the basic return. Given the fact most studies of the private rate of 
return to education only account for the earnings effect of education (usually only the 
earnings of employees) in their estimates, our results illustrate the wide variation in 
these estimates that may occur, given the various other components that may be 
included in their estimation.  
The various components of the marginal fiscal returns for the respective samples are 
seen in table 8. They are presented in a similar fashion to that seen for the private 
returns above, with different measures of the fiscal return estimated as more 
components of the marginal fiscal benefit are added (as we move across columns to 
the right in table 8). This is again estimated with a constant cost within tax/benefit 
years. Column A illustrates the fiscal return will be zero if the tax/benefit system is 
ignored within estimates of the fiscal returns to education, as is the case with most of 
the prevailing literature. However, as we add different elements of the tax/benefit 
system we see the fiscal return rise. The results indicate that it is the increase in 
income tax revenue that forms the most substantial element of the marginal benefit to 
the state from a marginal change in education. The employment effect
11 also has a 
significant impact while the role of varying benefits and SIC is relatively small. We 
also note that the tax component of the fiscal returns is falling as we move from 1987 
to 2005. This illustrates the falling tax rates and also the increasing marginal cost for 
the state due to higher public financing of education through these years.    
5  CONCLUSION 
The main focus of empirical estimates of the rate of return to education has focused 
upon the return to the individual based upon the relationship between gross earnings 
and education. The incorporation of the tax/benefit system, possible employment 
effects and other transitions brought about by a change in education that may impact 
the returns to education has largely been ignored. The return to the state emanating 
from this relationship between education, gross income and the tax/benefit system 
                                                 
11 The employment effect in this instance incorporates the increase in taxes, SIC and reduction in 
benefits brought about by those that move from inactivity to in-work from the marginal increase in 
education. have also not featured heavily in studies concerning the returns to education. Studies 
that have attempted to estimate these returns to education have done so using national 
representation of tax/benefit systems and may not have fully captured the full effects 
of a marginal increase in education. In this paper we show that microsimulation 
techniques can be utilised to estimate a marginal net private and fiscal return to 
education at the micro level, while also facilitating an analysis of the key components 
of the tax/benefit system that influence these measures. This is illustrated for Ireland 
for the period 1987-2005.  
Within the empirical results we find that the average marginal net private rate of 
return to education in Ireland has increased as the tax/benefit rules have moved from 
1987-2005. We also find that the average marginal return to the state has fallen over 
the same period. This indicates that a more generous tax/benefit system, combined 
with a greater state burden of the cost of education may have helped increase the 
individual’s return to education, while reducing the state return from investing in 
education. The results also show that the employment effect and the role of income 
taxes can have a huge positive impact on the return to the individual. The marginal 
fiscal return to education also largely consists of these two particular effects, with the 
role of varying benefits and SIC’s having a minor impact on the return to the state.   
From a methodological viewpoint, the techniques presented here could be utilised 
internationally given the fact that many countries have static micro tax/benefit models 
already established. Variations in tax/benefit policy across time could then help shape 
education policy by comparing the state versus private return. Also, using larger 
datasets could also help develop the methodology behind these estimations, to help 
correct for any possible endogeneity bias present.  TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1a: Transformation of the education variables for Living in Ireland 
survey. 
Level of education attained  Number of years taken 
No Education beyond Primary  6 
Primary Cert. Or equivalent  8 
Some 2nd. Level  9 
Junior or Inter Certificate.  11 
Leaving Certificate.  13 
Post Leaving Certificate   14 
Diploma 15 
Primary Degree  16 
Higher Degree  18 
Source: Living in Ireland Survey    
Note: These figures are approximations. The numbers denoted here are the typical times taken to 
achieve that qualification. 
 
 Table 1b: Distribution of years of education for Ireland (Sample: those aged over 
16 not in full time education) 










Source: Living in Ireland Survey   (2000) Table 2: Average monthly labour income, simulated income tax and simulated 
benefits for Ireland by years of education (Sample: those aged over 16 not in full 
time education) 
  Number of years taken of education 
  6 8 9 11  13  14  15  16  18 
Average monthly labour 
income (€) 







Simulated income tax (€) 
12.0  44.1  57.6  104.0 114.7 111.7 203.7 288.7 450.5 
Average monthly 
Simulated benefits (€) 
385.7 341.6 261.5 170.2 92.12 73.0  66.6  59.4  61.2 
Source: Living in Ireland Survey   (2000) 
 Table 3: Individual Social Welfare Amounts and Income Tax Rates in Ireland 
1987-2005 
Scheme 1987(€)  1994(€)  2000(€)  2005(€) 
Social Insurance  53.72  74.47  98.42  148.8 
Unemployment 
Benefit 69.97  90.17  121.92  179.3 
Contributory Old age 
Pension 0  0  112.4  163.7 
Carer’s Benefit  53.72  77.47  98.42  148.8 
Disability Benefit  53.72  74.47  98.42  148.8 
        
Social Assistance          
Non-Contributory 
Old age Pension  59.82  77.47  108.58  166 
Lone Parent 
Allowance 73.4  74.47 98.42  148.8 
Unemployment 
Assistance 48  74.47 98.42  148.8 
Child Benefit  19.11  25.4  43.82  131.6 
        
Tax Rates         
Rate 1   35%  27%  22%  20% 
Rate 2  48%  48%  44%  42% 
Rate 3  58%  .  .  . 
Source: Department of Social and Family Affairs (1998, 2001 and 2006).  
Note: Social welfare amounts are in current prices converted to Euro using the Euro/IR punt exchange 















Table 4: Expenditure per student in 1987-2005 by level of education and 
public/private share  
 
Year Primary  Secondary  Tertiary 
  Private (€)  Public (€)  Private (€)  Public (€)  Private (€)  Public (€)
1987 59    1425  96  2319  1620  3780 
1994 68 1629  110  2651  1851  4321 
1995 71 1700  112  2692  1796  4191 
1996 63 2037  95  3058  1827  4698 
1997 66 2138  99  3210  1918  4933 
1998 75 2434  107  3488  2103  5687 
1999 82 2676  120  3886  2387  6455 
2000 129  3111  177  4263  2228  8384 
2001 186  3551  261  4976  1498  8491 
2005 187  5668  245  7419  1711  8986 
Source: OECD, 1997-2008  
Note: all the figures presented here are in current prices 
 Table 5: List of Estimations Performed in Income Generation Model   
Model Estimated  Specification  Sample 
Is an individual in work or out of work?  logit  those >=16 years of age and 
not in education 
Are those that are in work in employed work or not  logit  those >=16 years of age, not 
in education and in work 
Whether those out of work are retired or not 
 
logit  those >=50 years of age and 
out of work 
Whether those out of work are classed as 
unemployed or not 
logit  those >=16 and <=64,  years 
of age, not in education, out 
of work and not retired 
Whether those out of work receive invalidity benefit  logit  those >=16 years of age, not 
in education, and out of work 
Whether those receiving invalidity benefit are 
receiving the short term or long term benefit 
 
logit  Those >16 years of age and 
receiving some form of 
invalidity benefit 
Are employees in public service or not? 
 
logit  those >=16 years of age, not 
in education, in work and 
employed 
The no. of hours worked by an individual 
 
OLS  those >=16 years of age, not 
in education and in work 
Whether an individual has an contributory pension 
or not  
logit  those >=65 years of age and 
not in work 
Whether an individual has occupational pension 
income or not 
logit   those >=65 years of age and 
not in work 
The level of income from an occupational pension 
income 
OLS  Those >=65 years of age and 
in receipt of occupational 
income 
Whether an individual is contributing to an 
occupational pension  
logit  Those >=16 and <=65 years 
of age and working as an 
employee 
The level of occupational pension contributions  OLS  Those >=16 and <=65 years 
of age and contributing to an 
occupational pension 
The level of employee earnings 
 
OLS  All those >=16 years of age, 
not in education, in work and 
employed 
The level of self employed earnings 
 
OLS  those >=16 years of age, not 
in education, in work and self 
employed (not farming) 
The level of farming income 
 
OLS  those >=16 years of age, not 
in education, in work and in 
farming 
Whether an individual has capital income or not  logit  those >=16 years of age and 
not in education 
The level of capital income 
 
OLS  those >=16 years of age, not 
in education and with capital 
income 
  
Table 6: Average net private and fiscal marginal returns to education for Ireland 
with tax benefit years 1987-2005  
Tax/benefit Year  Private  Fiscal 
1987 9.0%  8.9% 
1994 9.3%  8.4% 
1995 9.7%  8.7% 
1996 9.8%  8.3% 
1997 9.9%  8.2% 
1998 10.4%  7.7% 
1999 10.0%  7.5% 
2000 11.2%  6.2% 
2001 11.1%  6.3% 
2005 11.1%  6.9% 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000). 













 Table 7: Average net private marginal returns to education segmented by various components 














1987 9.6%  12.7%  12.8%  6.8%  6.3%  6.0%  9.0% 
1994 9.0%  11.9%  12.0%  7.0%  6.6%  6.3%  9.3% 
1995 9.3%  12.3%  12.4%  7.2%  6.8%  6.5%  9.7% 
1996 9.3%  12.3%  12.4%  7.2%  6.9%  6.6%  9.8% 
1997 9.3%  12.3%  12.4%  7.2%  6.9%  6.7%  9.9% 
1998 9.4%  12.5%  12.6%  7.6%  7.2%  7.0%  10.4% 
1999 9.1%  12.1%  12.2%  7.2%  6.8%  6.6%  10.0% 
2000 9.6%  12.7%  12.8%  8.2%  7.8%  7.6%  11.2% 
2001 9.2%  12.1%  12.2%  8.1%  7.7%  7.5%  11.1% 
2005 9.3%  12.3%  12.4%  8.1%  7.6%  7.5%  11.1% 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000). 
Note: SIC indicates social insurance contributions 
 
 Table 8: Average fiscal marginal returns to education segmented by various components 










1987 0.0%  5.5%  6.1%  6.9%  8.9% 
1994 0.0%  5.2%  5.8%  6.6%  8.4% 
1995 0.0%  5.6%  6.1%  6.9%  8.7% 
1996 0.0%  5.9%  6.3%  6.6%  8.3% 
1997 0.0%  5.9%  6.3%  6.5%  8.2% 
1998 0.0%  5.3%  5.7%  6.0%  7.7% 
1999 0.0%  5.4%  5.7%  6.0%  7.5% 
2000 0.0%  4.4%  4.7%  5.0%  6.2% 
2001 0.0%  4.5%  4.8%  5.1%  6.3% 
2005 0.0%  4.9%  5.3%  5.6%  6.9% 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000). 
Note: SIC indicates social insurance contributions 
 
 Appendix: Income Generation Model Selected Estimations 
 
Results of in/out of work logit model  
Variables Males  Females 
In/out of work 
dummy 
Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Years of Education   0.11  0  0.20  0 
Marriage Dummy  0.10  0.20  -0.091  0.26 
No. of Children  0.17  0  .019  0.543 
Dublin -0.15  0.17  0.327  0.004 
Mid-Eastern region  0.009  0.94  0.16  0.242 
Midlands region  0.38  0.008  0.18  0.209 
Mid-West region  0.064  0.63  0.273  0.051 
South-East region  0.227  0.06  0.423  0.001 
South-West region  -0.466  0  -0.092  0.453 
Western region  -0.016  0.89  -0.13  0.35 
Potential Experience  0.058  0  0.056  0 
Potential Experience
2 -0.0012  0  -0.0015  0 
Chronic Illness 
Dummy 
-1.38 0  -1.67 0 
Constant -1.7  0  -3.13  0 
        
Observations 5352    Observations  5318 
R-squared 0.166    R-squared  0.15 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000)  
Note: The in/out of work dummy is specified with 1 = in work and 0 = out of work 
Note: The marriage dummy is specified with 1 = married and 0 = not married 
Note: The Chronic illness dummy is specified with 1 = having a chronic illness and 0 = not having a 
chronic illness 
Note: The border region of Ireland is used a the base category for the regionally dummies 






















Employment dummy  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Years of Education   0.06  0.001  -0.024  0.54 
Marriage Dummy  0.29  0.03  0.014  0.95 
No. of Children  -0.29  0  -0.13  0.23 
Dublin 0.87  0  1.00  0.003 
Mid-Eastern region  0.25  0.22  0.48  0.20 
Midlands region  -0.059  0.77  0.18  0.64 
Mid-West region  0.11  0.57  0.64  0.11 
South-East region  -0.0005  0.99  -0.22  0.47 
South-West region  -0.1  0.58  0.36  0.29 
Western region  -0.21  0.28  0.33  0.38 
Potential Experience  -0.04  0  0.017  0.43 
Potential Experience
2 -0.0002  0.33  -0.001  0.006 
Constant 1.62 0  3.07  0 
        
Observations 2279    Observations  1988 
R-squared 0.15    R-squared  0.07 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000)  
Note: The employment dummy is specified with 1 = employed and 0 = not employed 
Note: The marriage dummy is specified with 1 = married and 0 = not married 
Note: The border region is used a the base category for the regionally dummies 





























Retirement dummy  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Years of Education   0.07  0.01  0.1  0 
Marriage Dummy  0.61  0.002  -1.32  0 
No. of Children  0.06  0.81  -0.27  0.23 
Dublin 0.085  0.77  0.036  0.88 
Mid-Eastern region  -0.71  0.04  -0.14  0.68 
Midlands region  0.162  0.68  -0.44  0.21 
Mid-West region  -0.36  0.3  -1.1  0.01 
South-East region  -0.34  0.31  -0.03  0.9 
South-West region  -0.71  0.01  0.2  0.2 
Western region  -0.31  0.3  -0.05  0.86 
Potential Experience  0.6  0  0.57  0 
Potential Experience
2 -0.004  0  -0.004  0 
Constant -19.86  0  -19.1  0 
        
Observations 1126    Observations  1582 
R-squared 0.36   R-squared  0.17 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000)  
Note: The retirement dummy is specified with 1 = retired and 0 = not retired 
Note: The marriage dummy is specified with 1 = married and 0 = not married 
Note: The border region is used a the base category for the regionally dummies 






























dummy Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Years of Education   -0.18  0  -0.07  0.07 
Marriage Dummy  -0.42  0.05  -1.17  0 
No. of Children  0.17  0.05  -0.14  0.25 
Dublin -0.37  0.12  -1.09  0.001 
Mid-Eastern region  -0.67  0.04  -0.38  0.27 
Midlands region  -0.96  0.02  -0.5  0.18 
Mid-West region  -0.21  0.49  -0.27  0.43 
South-East region  -0.032  0.9  -0.31  0.34 
South-West region  -0.44  0.08  -1.22  0.001 
Western region  -0.43  0.16  -0.9  0.01 
Potential Experience  0.06  0.001  0.044  0.07 
Potential Experience
2 -0.001  0.005  -0.001  0.02 
Constant 0.036  0.93  -1.02  0.06 
        
Observations 1750    Observations  2403 
R-squared 0.05   R-squared  0.09 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000)  
Note: The Unemployment dummy is specified with 1 = Unemployed and 0 = not unemployed 
Note: The marriage dummy is specified with 1 = married and 0 = not married 
Note: The border region is used a the base category for the regionally dummies 




























Public sector dummy  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Years of Education   0.19  0  0.23  0 
Marriage Dummy  0.54  0.001  0.23  0.10 
No. of Children  -0.03  0.63  0.17  0.004 
Dublin 0.26  0.14  0.14  0.42 
Mid-Eastern region  -0.23  0.28  -0.38  0.09 
Midlands region  0.31  0.16  -0.091  0.71 
Mid-West region  -0.11  0.61  -0.15  0.49 
South-East region  -0.52  0.02  -0.19  0.37 
South-West region  -0.34  0.1  -0.25  0.22 
Western region  -0.09  0.67  -0.037  0.87 
Potential Experience  0.069  0  0.038  0.01 
Potential Experience
2 -0.0007  0.01  -0.0004  0.18 
Constant -5.12  0  -5.02  0 
        
Observations 2606    Observations  2201 
R-squared 0.11   R-squared  0.05 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000)  
Note: The public sector dummy is specified with 1 = in work in the public sector and 0 = not in work in 
the public sector 
Note: The marriage dummy is specified with 1 = married and 0 = not married 
Note: The border region is used a the base category for the regionally dummies 


































dummy Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Years of Education   -0.28  0  -0.25  0 
Marriage Dummy  0.05  0.8  -0.76  0 
No. of Children  -0.23  0.08  -0.29  0.02 
Dublin 0.32  0.26  0.5  0.15 
Mid-Eastern region  0.33  0.35  0.78  0.05 
Midlands region  0.45  0.2  0.67  0.10 
Mid-West region  -0.12  0.77  0.71  0.09 
South-East region  0.39  0.23  0.15  0.73 
South-West region  -0.22  0.48  0.39  0.3 
Western region  0.13  0.71  0.64  0.12 
Potential Experience  0.17  0  0.175  0 
Potential Experience
2 -0.003  0  -0.003  0 
Constant -1.5  0.009  -1.5  0.006 
        
Observations 2569    Observations  3323 
R-squared 0.16   R-squared  0.14 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000)  
Note: The invalidity benefit dummy is specified with 1 = in receipt of invalidity benefit and 0 = not in 
receipt of invalidity benefit  
Note: The marriage dummy is specified with 1 = married and 0 = not married 
Note: The border region is used a the base category for the regionally dummies 




























Short term invalidity 
benefit dummy  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Years of Education   0.13  0.053  0.173  0.008 
Marriage Dummy  0.53  0.26  0.19  0.63 
No. of Children  0.53  0.022  0.44  0.12 
Dublin 0.27  0.63  -0.67  0.3 
Mid-Eastern region  0.14  0.83  -0.86  0.27 
Midlands region  0.19  0.79  -2.2  0.01 
Mid-West region  -0.48  0.48  -0.04  0.95 
South-East region  -0.26  0.69  -0.71  0.37 
South-West region  -0.41  0.53  -1.04  0.14 
Western region  0.083  0.9  -1.055  0.17 
Potential Experience  -0.039  0.42  -0.04  0.33 
Potential Experience
2 -0.00006  0.94  0.0005  0.44 
Constant -1.1  0.31  -0.8  0.46 
        
Observations 202    Observations  164 
R-squared 0.14   R-squared  0.13 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000)  
Note: The Short term invalidity benefit dummy is specified with 1 = in receipt of short term invalidity 
benefit and 0 = not in receipt of short term invalidity benefit 
Note: The marriage dummy is specified with 1 = married and 0 = not married 
Note: The border region is used a the base category for the regionally dummies 



























Log weekly working 
hours Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Years of Education   -0.0018  0.42  0.015  0 
Marriage Dummy  0.03  0.08  -0.064  0.002 
No. of Children  -0.0064  0.34  -0.057  0 
Dublin 0.027  0.1  -0.051  0.05 
Mid-Eastern region  0.065  0  -0.011  0.73 
Midlands region  0.037  0.13  0.0058  0.86 
Mid-West region  0.052  0.03  -0.02  0.53 
South-East region  0.023  0.30  0.009  0.77 
South-West region  -0.021  0.32  -0.013  0.65 
Western region  0.011  0.62  -0.009  0.78 
Potential Experience  0.0062  0  -0.003  0.08 
Potential Experience
2 -0.0001  0  3.86E-05  0.4 
Constant 3.62  0  3.41  0 
        
Observations 2058    Observations  1678 
R-squared 0.04   R-squared  0.08 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000)  
Note: The marriage dummy is specified with 1 = married and 0 = not married 
Note: The border region is used a the base category for the regionally dummies 






























income dummy  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Years of Education   -0.06  0.02  -0.06  0.04 
Marriage Dummy  0.21  0.24  -0.53  0.01 
Duration in Work  0.006  0.35  0.031  0 
Dublin 1.01  0  0.31  0.29 
Mid-Eastern region  0.31  0.36  -0.43  0.35 
Midlands region  -0.3  0.38  -0.73  0.11 
Mid-West region  -0.39  0.29  -0.46  0.32 
South-East  region 0.1  0.56 -0.43 0.22 
South-West region  0.06  0.8  -0.62  0.08 
Western region  -0.44  0.13  -0.41  0.26 
Age -0.07  0.79  0.1  0.75 
Age
2 0.0002  0.88  -0.00097  0.67 
Constant 3.53  0.73  -3.57  0.78 
        
Observations 760    Observations  827 
R-squared 0.05   R-squared  0.7 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000)  
Note: The contributory pension income dummy is specified with 1 = have contributory pension income 
and 0 = do not have contributory pension income 
Note: The marriage dummy is specified with 1 = married and 0 = not married 
Note: The border region is used a the base category for the regionally dummies 

































income dummy  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Years of Education   0.18  0  0.15  0 
Marriage Dummy  0.077  0.7  -0.63  0.01 
Duration in Work  0.026  0  0.044  0 
Dublin 1.4  0  0.81  0.03 
Mid-Eastern region  0.26  0.49  0.37  0.48 
Midlands region  0.65  0.08  0.13  0.8 
Mid-West region  0.4  0.29  0.31  0.54 
South-East region  0.37  0.26  -0.17  0.71 
South-West region  -0.18  0.58  -0.02  0.95 
Western region  -0.16  0.65  -0.14  0.77 
Age 0.2  0.51  0.57  0.14 
Age
2 -0.001  0.42  -0.0039  0.13 
Constant -10.42  0.36  -25.34  0.08 
        
Observations 760    Observations  827 
R-squared 0.15   R-squared  0.15 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000)  
Note: The occupational pension income dummy dummy is specified with 1 = have occupational 
pension income and 0 = do not have occupational pension income  
Note: The marriage dummy is specified with 1 = married and 0 = not married 
Note: The border region is used a the base category for the regionally dummies 





























income    Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Years of Education   0.17  0  0.19  0 
Marriage Dummy  0.29  0.08  -0.035  0.87 
Duration in Work  -0.01  0.14  -0.0031  0.65 
Dublin -0.44  0.07  0.5  0.17 
Mid-Eastern region  -0.67  0.03  0.38  0.45 
Midlands region  -0.63  0.04  -0.32  0.51 
Mid-West region  -0.5  0.11  0.87  0.07 
South-East region  -0.68  0.018  0.27  0.54 
South-West region  -0.31  0.29  0.22  0.6 
Western region  -0.08  0.78  0.3  0.51 
Age 0.21  0.36  0.16  0.68 
Age
2 -0.0015  0.33  -0.0011  0.67 
Constant -0.36  0.96  0.01  0.99 
        
Observations 243    Observations  102 
R-squared 0.32   R-squared  0.4 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000)  
Note: The marriage dummy is specified with 1 = married and 0 = not married 
Note: The border region is used a the base category for the regionally dummies 






























dummy Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Years of Education   0.1  0  0.11  0 
Marriage Dummy  0.17  0.25  0.1  0.45 
No. of Children  0.06  0.28  0.024  0.7 
Duration in Work  0.046  0  0.055  0 
Dublin -0.007  0.96  0.29  0.1 
Mid-Eastern region  0.06  0.75  0.13  0.55 
Midlands region  0.38  0.09  0.2  0.41 
Mid-West region  0.05  0.80  0.11  0.6 
South-East region  0.4  0.05  0.57  0.01 
South-West region  -0.53  0.003  -0.19  0.33 
Western region  -0.21  0.30  -0.28  0.21 
Age 0.034  0.12  -0.01  0.69 
Age
2 -0.0007  0.007  0.00004  0.88 
Constant -1.05  0.03  -0.74  0.19 
        
Observations 2602    Observations  2201 
R-squared 0.05   R-squared  0.05 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000)  
Note: The Contributions to occupational pension dummy is specified with 1 = do make contributions to 
occupational pension and 0 = do not make contributions to occupational pension 
Note: The marriage dummy is specified with 1 = married and 0 = not married 
Note: The border region is used a the base category for the regionally dummies 



























occupational pension   Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Years of Education   0.13  0  0.18  0 
Marriage Dummy  0.28  0  -0.09  0.09 
No. of Children  0.04  0.06  0.012  0.61 
Duration in Work  0.026  0  0.03  0 
Dublin 0.25  0  0.08  0.23 
Mid-Eastern region  0.14  0.05  -0.002  0.98 
Midlands region  -0.069  0.38  -0.006  0.95 
Mid-West region  0.14  0.05  -0.008  0.92 
South-East region  -0.018  0.79  -0.13  0.1 
South-West region  -0.049  0.48  -0.14  0.09 
Western region  -0.1  0.15  0.0072  0.94 
Age 0.084  0  0.036  0 
Age
2 -0.001  0  -0.0004  0 
Constant 2.47  0  2.56  0 
        
Observations 2243    Observations  1960 
R-squared 0.36   R-squared  0.27 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000)  
Note: The marriage dummy is specified with 1 = married and 0 = not married 
Note: The border region is used a the base category for the regionally dummies 






















Log monthly gross 
earnings Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Years of Education   0.052  0  0.74  0 
Potential Experience  0.062  0  0.021  0 
Potential Experience
2 -0.001  0  -0.0005  0 
Dublin 0.201  0  0.039  0.54 
Mid-Eastern region  0.088  0.15  -0.02  0.7 
Midlands region  0.064  0.3  0.019  0.82 
Mid-West region  0.02  0.7  -0.052  0.51 
South-East region  -0.05  0.4  -0.132  0.08 
South-West region  -0.013  0.8  -0.06  0.37 
Western region  0.016  0.7  -0.01  0.8 
Inverse Mill’s ratio  -.95  0  .2  .625 
Constant 9.2  0  8.84  0 
Observations 2056    Observations  1778 
R-squared 0.329    R-squared  0.25 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000)  
Note: The border region is used as the base category for the regionally dummies 































Log monthly gross 
earnings Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Years of Education   0.07  0  0.08  0.44 
Potential Experience  0.027  0.01  0.019  0.4 
Potential Experience
2 -0.0004  0.05  -0.0006  0.26 
Dublin 0.62  0  0.46  0.3 
Mid-Eastern region  0.51  0.009  0.59  0.24 
Midlands region  0.178  0.4  0.44  0.4 
Mid-West region  0.3  0.13  0.68  0.24 
South-East region  0.41  0.02  0.75  0.1 
South-West region  0.24  0.19  1.55  0.005 
Western region  0.25  0.2  0.94  0.09 
Inverse Mill’s ratio  -1.05  0  1.9  .233 
Constant 8.25  0  8.2  0 
        
Observations 305    Observations  74 
R-squared 0.14    R-squared  0.21 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000)  
Note: The border region is used as the base category for the regionally dummies 



























 Results of Farm Income OLS model  
Variables  
Log monthy gross earnings  Coefficient  p-value 
Years of Education   0.069  0 
Potential Experience  0.0061  0.71 
Potential Experience
2 -0.00003  0.91 
Dublin 0.49  0.43 
Mid-Eastern region  0.89  0.001 
Midlands region  0.68  0 
Mid-West region  0.77  0.001 
South-East region  0.99  0 
South-West region  1.2  0 
Western region  -0.05  0.75 
Constant 7.72  0 
    
Observations 274   
R-squared 0.28   
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000)  
Note: The border region is used as the base category for the regionally dummies 



































dummy Coefficient  p-value Coefficient p-value 
Years of Education   0.1  0  0.08  0 
Age 0.034  0  0.03  0 
Age
2 -0.00008  0.48  -0.0001  0.23 
No. of Children  -0.04  0.3  0.063  0.18 
Work Income  0.00003  0  0.00003  0 
Dublin 0.59  0  0.78  0 
Mid-Eastern region  0.13  0.42  0.54  0.003 
Midlands region  -0.17  0.36  -0.1  0.65 
Mid-West region  -0.17  0.32  -0.01  0.94 
South-East region  0.2  0.18  0.46  0.008 
South-West region  0.15  0.31  0.21  0.21 
Western region  0.53  0.001  0.27  0.14 
Constant -4.8  0  -4.6  0 
        
Observations 5228    Observations  5195 
R-squared 0.12   R-squared  0.06 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000)  
Note: The capital income dummy is specified with 1 = have capital income 0 = do not have capital 
income 
Note: The border region is used as the base category for the regionally dummies 




























Log monthly capital 
income   Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Years of Education   0.06  0.006  0.1  0 
Age 0.05  0.01  0.023  0.24 
Age
2 -0.0001  0.6  0.0001  0.58 
No. of Children  -0.04  0.53  0.0067  0.93 
Work Income  9.12E-06  0.002  7.80E-06  0.1 
Dublin -0.24  0.27  0.071  0.78 
Mid-Eastern region  0.15  0.57  0.180  0.56 
Midlands region  0.39  0.23  0.39  0.3 
Mid-West region  0.16  0.58  -0.11  0.7 
South-East region  0.58  0.02  0.27  0.36 
South-West region  0.094  0.71  0.26  0.37 
Western region  0.16  0.52  0.27  0.39 
Constant 2.23  0  1.82  0.006 
        
Observations 1027    Observations  728 
R-squared 0.12   R-squared  0.1 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (2000)  
Note: The border region is used as the base category for the regionally dummies 
Note: The sample specifications are outlined in table 5 